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NETWORK TRIADS: TRANSITIVITY, REFERRAL AND VENTURE CAPITAL 
DECISIONS IN CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
Abstract: This article examines effects of dyadic ties and interpersonal trust on referrals and 
investment decisions of venture capitalists in the Chinese and Russian contexts. The study uses 
the postulate of transitivity of social network theory as a conceptual framework. The findings 
reveal that referee-venture capitalist tie, referee-entrepreneur tie, and interpersonal trust between 
referee and venture capitalist have positive effects on referrals and investment decisions of 
venture capitalists. The institutional, social and cultural differences between China and Russia 
have minimal effects on referrals. Interpersonal trust has positive effects on investment decisions 
in Russia. 
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Social network theory postulates that personal networks of actors tend to be transitive: one’s 
friends’ friends are likely to become one’s friends as well (Granovetter 1973). Transitivity is a 
tendency that two actors who are connected to a third-party form mutual relationships over time. 
The main reason why triads, i.e., triples of actors, tend to be transitive is that actors strive to 
reduce inconsistencies and uncertainties in their social and cognitive worlds, and attempt to 
establish balances in interpersonal relationships (Heider 1964; Holland and Leinhardt 1976). For 
example, in friendship triads, unbalanced relationships, i.e., E likes R and R likes V, but E does 
not like V (See Figure 1), may cause emotional tensions, and therefore, actors try to make triads 
complete by forming friendly relations with other actors or withdrawing from that triad 
(Krackhardt and Kilduff 1999). Empirical studies have consistently found that the principle of 
transitivity applies in about 70-80 percent of all cases across a variety of small group situations 
(Davis 1970; Robinson and Balkwell 1995). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
  Whether a triad is transitive or intransitive, however, depends on various factors. 
Granovetter (1973) argued that transitivity is a function of the strength of dyadic ties in triads. 
He suggested that let E choose R, and R choose V (or equivalently, let V choose R, and R choose 
E), then transitivity⎯E choosing V (or V, E)⎯is most likely when both ties⎯E-R and R-V⎯are 
strong, least likely when both are weak, and intermediate probability if one is strong and one is 
weak. Hallinan and Hutchins (1980) found that triads composed of boys were more transitive 
than triads composed of girls. Similarly, Louch (2000) reported that triads comprised of 
homogeneous actors in terms of race, education, and religion, were more transitive and 
integrated over time than heterogeneous triads. Burt (1999) concluded that triads were more 
likely to be cohesive and balanced when there is trust between three actors. In the context of 
research collaboration among scientists, Newman (2001) documented that those scientists who 
have had common co-authors were more likely to collaborate and form relationships over time 
than those who did not share authorship. At the inter-organizational level, Uzzi and Gillespie 
(2002) found that small firms learn from embedded relationships with their banks, and leverage 
that financial knowledge in relationships with their trade-creditors. They argued that knowledge 
transfers in triads improve firms’ debt performance. The empirical evidence on transitivity 
suggests that two actors who are connected to a third party are likely to form a certain type of 
relationship, depending on the strength of ties, interpersonal trust, demographic characteristics,   4
and homophily, because of the propensity of actors to balance their social relationships (Holland 
and Leinhardt 1976). Ties initiated, formed, and maintained between two actors in triads may 
have various contents such as friendship, information sharing, scientific collaboration, and 
learning. 
In this study, I focus on venture capital (VC) referral and investment decision as 
indicators of transitivity in triads. Venture capital referral is defined as a third-party’s 
recommendation of an entrepreneur as a potential equity capital receiver to a venture capitalist. 
Investment decision is defined as a venture capitalist’s decision to invest or not-to-invest in a 
venture. Previous studies of venture capital examined investment oversight (Lerner 1995), the 
role of private equity in product development (Hellman and Puri 2000), spatial distribution of 
investments (Sorenson and Stuart 2001), entrepreneur-venture capitalist interactions in the post-
investment period (Cable and Shane 1997; Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996), and effects of direct 
and indirect ties of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists on investment decisions (Shane and 
Cable 2002; Shane and Stuart 2002). 
Using the concept of transitivity, I examine the impact of dyadic ties between three 
actors, namely, entrepreneur - E, venture capitalist - V, and third-party referee - R, on venture 
capital referral, and investment decision in the Chinese and Russian contexts. I propose that 
strong ties between referee, venture capitalist, and entrepreneur affect positively third-party 
referral and investment decision, because of the transitive nature of  triads. I suggest that the way 
in which dyadic relationships in triads affects referral and investment decision differs in China 
and Russia, because of the institutional, social, and cultural differences between the two 
countries (Hitt et al. 2004). 
  This article is structured as follows: In the next section, I describe the Chinese and the 
Russian contexts. In the following section, I propose hypotheses on referral and investment 
decision. The methods section describes the sample, the data collection, the measurements, and 
the construct validation procedures. In the results and discussion sections, I present the findings 
and discuss them in light of social network theory. In the conclusion, I highlight the 
contributions, the limitations, and the implications of this study.   5
CONTEXTS 
The Chinese Context 
The Chinese Private Equity Industry. The Chinese VC industry is the largest private equity 
industry in Asia. In 2001, China, together with Hong Kong, captured 30% of Asia’s private 
equity investment. By the middle of 2002, the total VC fund pool in mainland China reached 
US$7.15 billion (Business Weekly 2003). In 2003, China attracted $1.57 billion in foreign private 
equity (BusinessWeek, 2004). There were 325 domestic VC firms registered in China by mid-
2002 (Business Weekly 2003). Some 60 foreign VC firms operate in China (Liu 2001). In the 
first two quarters of 2002, $175 million were invested in 85 projects. Some 36 foreign firms 
invested $87 million while Chinese firms invested $70 million (Business Weekly 2003). 
  Although the Chinese VC industry has taken off rather well, some serious institutional, 
regulatory, and human capital issues remain unresolved. The main legal form of VC 
firms⎯limited liability partnership⎯is not recognized in China’s laws. Therefore, all VC firms 
are registered and operate as limited liability companies, adding confusion as well as serious 
risks to the processes by which VC firms raise, invest, and manage funds. Rights and 
responsibilities of general partners (fund managers) versus limited partners (investors in funds) 
are not adequately defined under the law. Furthermore, the assets of the VC firm are not 
separated legally from those of the fund, thus increasing agency risks in venture investments, 
such as misuse of funds. The state’s participation is immense, and it often plays roles of 
shareholder, investor, fund manager, and auditor of VC firms simultaneously. This situation 
exacerbates the regulatory chaos and uncertain external environment for VC firms. 
Social Networks in China: Guanxi. The Chinese version of social networks is guanxi (Xin and 
Pearce 1996). Guanxi is defined as special relationships due to the existence of particularistic ties 
(Tsui et al. 2000). Guanxi ties promote interpersonal trust (Farh et al. 1998), facilitate job 
mobility (Bian 1997), and enhance firm performance (Park and Luo 2001). In the context of 
private equity, researchers found that Chinese venture capitalists rely heavily on guanxi ties to 
reduce uncertainties and use universalistic investment criteria in particularistic ways to make 
investment decisions (Batjargal and Liu 2004; Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003). 
The Russian Context 
The Russian Private Equity Industry. The Russian VC industry is slightly older and much 
smaller than the Chinese industry. There were more than 40 domestic VC firms with total funds   6
of $4 billion (E-Trust Investment Group 2004). These funds invested $600 million in more than 
300 projects during 1994-2001. The weighted average return on investment is 16%. Some 27% 
of investment funds went into food industry, 9%⎯medical services and pharmaceuticals, 
5%⎯packaging, and 25% were invested into technology startups. International development 
agencies such as IMF and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) set up 10 
regional venture funds with total capital of $320 million in the early 1990s (Tacis 2001). These 
firms were first dedicated VC companies in the country. Increasingly, large Russian corporations 
such as LUKoil and Alpha Capital are setting up VC funds that invest in technology startups. In 
this respect, Russia differs from China where foreign donor agencies do not run VC funds and 
private corporations play limited roles. 
  Despite its impressive growth, the Russian VC firms face serious economic, regulatory 
and institutional uncertainties. The Russian government has no supportive policy of private 
equity investment. The legal framework is as primitive as it is in China. For example, the use of 
preferred stock and other convertible securities is not permitted. Like in China, limited exit 
routes prevent flows of capital into equity funds. Most domestic VC firms are concentrated in 
Moscow, in contrast to China where VC funds are located in 53 high tech zones across the 
country. 
Social Networks in Russia: Svyazi. The Russian version of social networks is svyazi 
(connections). Some scholars referred to Russian networks as blat – a set of informal ties central 
to economic survival in the Soviet economy of shortages (Ledeneva 1998). Previous research 
found that svyazi networks reduce uncertainties in financial transactions (Guseva and Rona-Tas 
2001), and facilitate entrepreneurs’ access to resources (Sedaitis 1998). 
HYPOTHESES 
Referral and Investment Decision 
It is common practice in private equity industry that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
get connected through third-parties who recommend founders and investors to each other (Shane 
& Stuart 2002). For example, roughly 50% of private equity deals in China were based on third-
party recommendations (Sheng et al. 2003). I propose that strong ties between entrepreneurs, 
venture capitalists, and referees influence third-party recommendations or referrals. 
When the referee-venture capitalist tie is strong, referees are motivated to find and 
recommend promising projects, and therefore, they screen large pools of actors who are not   7
connected directly to the investor (Fernandez et al. 2000). These referees are likely to regard 
highly those teams whom they chosen to recommend, and this positive assessment leads to 
strong referrals. Friendly relations between referees and venture capitalists enable referees to 
know well investment preference, post-investment involvement, and personality of venture 
capitalists. This knowledge helps referees to select those teams that match investors’ 
requirements, and this matching motivates referees to issue strong recommendations (Fernandez 
et al. 2000). An important factor that influences referrals is third-parties’ awareness that by 
filtering and finding promising startups, they reduce search and identification costs of investors, 
and in this way, they do favors for their friends (Burt 1992; Fernandez & Castilla 2001). 
Therefore, referees would recommend strongly selected venture teams to investors, who are their 
friends. By connecting good startup teams with investors, referees manufacture social debts of 
venture capitalists to them, and therefore, they may be inclined to generate more convincing 
recommendations, because it increases their social “receivables” (Yang 1994). Friendships may 
create a sense of certainty, and increase referees’ confidence in positive outcomes of 
transactions, and therefore, third-parties may send strong referrals (Batjargal & Liu 2004). 
Interpersonal liking between friends may also influence referrals, because intermediaries are 
likely to see recommendations as a social act that make triads complete and balanced (Holland & 
Leinhardt 1976). Field interviews revealed consistent findings. A fund manager in a private 
equity firm said in an interview: 
Liu was my dorm-mate at Nangkai University about 20 years ago. But we did not keep in touch 
for some reasons. Then, we met 2 years ago again at a conference on leveraged buy-out. 
Although my firm does not invest in new and small firms such as his, we started to talk about 
possible business opportunities. My partners and I have got to know well of what these guys are 
up to. Although we were not sure of their business model, we liked their product: a special 
device that serve as router between mobile and non–mobile communications equipment. 
Eventually, I linked this team to a university-funded venture capital firm that focuses on telecom 
and IT ventures (Author’s interview, March 2003, Beijing). 
 
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the tie between the referee and the venture capitalist, the stronger the 
referral. 
   8
Referee-entrepreneur relationship affects referrals through several mechanisms such as 
social obligation, informal pressure, information transfer, manufacturing social debts, matching, 
and propensity of players to balance triads. Third-parties may recommend entrepreneurs strongly 
because they see this as a fulfillment of their social obligations and meeting their friends’ 
expectations (Shane & Cable 2002). Entrepreneurs may put informal pressures on referees to be 
positive about their ventures, and this pressure may strengthen referrals. Lasting relationships 
and frequent communications between referees and entrepreneurs lead to fine-grained, honest, 
and timely information exchanges, and this enables referees to obtain objective knowledge about 
intentions, motives, personality, and post-investment behavior of entrepreneurs. In this way, 
strong ties reduce referees’ social uncertainties and risks. Lowered social risks may be conducive 
to more persuasive referrals. By recommending entrepreneurs to potential investors, referees 
generate social “receivables” from entrepreneurs, and strong recommendations produce greater 
debts of entrepreneurs to third parties (Yang 1994). Because intermediaries are knowledgeable 
about entrepreneurs’ financial plans and strategy, they are likely to select those teams that 
correspond investors’ policy, and this may lead to enthusiastic recommendations. Lastly, because 
third-parties and entrepreneurs are friends, referees may try to establish good relationships 
between their friends in order to make their social worlds consistent. In its turn, this generates 
credible referrals. Evidence from field interviews is consistent with this logic. An investment 
banker who recommended an entrepreneur to a venture capitalist said in an interview: 
Wang and I worked together for 10 years in this bank. I used to work in the product development 
area, and he was in charge of large customers –heavily indebted state enterprises. It is a tough 
business. We had our ups and downs but we kept our friendship in tact for years by now. I regard 
him as a highly motivated, able, and reliable professional, and that is why I introduced him to 
this venture capitalist. Furthermore, I told the venture capitalist that if they consider seriously his 
venture, we are willing to provide long-term loans to this company (Author’s interview, March 
2003, Beijing). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The stronger the tie between the referee and the entrepreneur, the stronger the 
referral. 
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Interpersonal and cognitive trust between referees and venture capitalists may lead to 
positive investment decisions. Venture capitalists are likely to trust judgments of referees about 
entrepreneurial team ability, technology/product, and growth potential of the venture (Shane & 
Cable 2002). Based on referees’ assessment, investors may regard venture teams as able, 
experienced, and complementarily skilled. In addition, fund managers are likely to perceive 
entrepreneurs as trustworthy, less opportunistic, and motivated, when they believe in third-
parties. Potential investors may be inclined to assess positively technical and market 
characteristics of the product, and product development capabilities of the firm, if referees and 
general partners have enduring trusted relationships. High-trust relationships may lead to 
optimistic assessments of growth potential of ventures because exchange partners are likely to 
overestimate each others’ capabilities and resources. Strong ties may increase investors’ 
confidence in projected success of ventures, and confident venture capitalists are likely to 
interpret information about young firms in favorable ways (Zacharakis & Shepherd 2001). All 
these factors may influence positively venture capitalists’ investment decisions. Ethnographic 
evidence is consistent with this line of reasoning. A lead fund manager of a private equity firm 
said in an interview: 
There is no doubt that our relationship played an important role in making this decision. Our firm 
is owned fully by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and therefore, we are instructed to 
invest in spin-offs of the CAS. However, we liked this company because it already had products 
- wind-resistant paints that were produced by nanotechnology methods. Zhang is a trained 
chemist, and therefore, we had to rely on his judgment on scientific and technological aspect of 
this product (Author’s interview, September 2003, Beijing). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Trust of referee is associated positively with investment decision. 
China versus Russia 
The institutional evolution in China and Russia differs sharply. The Russian reforms 
resulted in the destruction of existing institutions and networks (Hitt et al, 2004). This forced 
actors, including entrepreneurs, to restructure their networks and join new clusters (Kharkhordin 
and Gerber 1994; Sedaitis 1998). In contrast, the institutional status quo in China enabled actors, 
including entrepreneurs, to preserve their guanxi networks intact over time (Dai 2002; Yang   10
1994). Newer network clusters and triads are likely to be intransitive compared to the older and 
more established triads.  
Arguably, Russian society is more mobile both horizontally and vertically, because of the 
more liberalized labor market and elimination of the household registration system – propiska, 
and this facilitates people’s movement. The Chinese labor market is becoming flexible, although 
rigidities remain because of the household registration system – hukou that constrains flows of 
people, ideas, and resources (Bian 1997). This is reflected in greater membership turnover in the 
Russian networks than in the Chinese networks. This may result in weaker ties and less trust in 
Russian dyadic and triadic relationships. Furthermore, China and Russia are different in terms of 
their national culture. The Russian culture is European or Western, and more individualistic-
oriented, whereas the Chinese culture is Eastern, and more relationship-oriented (Ralston et al, 
1997). This implies that the Chinese triads may be more cohesive and transitive, while the 
Russian triads are less integrated. 
  The Chinese are more particularistic than the Russians due to the relational Chinese 
culture (Bian 1997; Tsui et al, 2000). Therefore, guanxi relationships would have greater positive 
impacts on referrals and investment decisions. In the Russian context, particularistic ties are 
expected to affect referrals and decisions positively because of the institutional and cultural 
factors that force actors to rely heavily on personal relationships. However, this impact is likely 
to be weaker than in China. Dyadic ties are stronger in China, because most network members 
are recruited according to guanxi base, i.e., propensity to form relationships based on common 
background, for example, ancestral origin, and classmate (Bian 1997; Farh et al, 1998). In 
Russia, relational base as a networking principle is not as prevalent as it is in China, and 
therefore, contact recruitment is less path-dependent and more spontaneous. Strong ties are more 
motivated to provide relevant information, and deliver useful resources. Actors, who perceive 
dyadic ties as strong, may be more confident in successful outcomes of transactions, and be 
biased in each other’s capabilities. Therefore, it is expected that the Chinese guanxi will have 
greater effects on outcome variables. 
  Social reciprocity is less universal and often ignored in relationships in Russia. This is in 
sharp contrast to the Chinese guanxi, which contains renching – well-articulated set of 
expectations and exchange norms (Yang 1994). This may positively influence impacts of dyadic 
ties and relational trust on referrals and investment decisions. Informal control in triads is   11
stronger in China, because there are sophisticated social devices of detecting and sanctioning 
opportunistic behavior, e.g., saving and losing face (Lin 2001). In contrast, social sanctions used 
to punish deviant behavior are less severe and effective in Russia, and therefore, network 
members have greater autonomies in their networking behavior (Ledeneva 1998).  
The Chinese networks are denser. They are composed of more family members, 
schoolmates, and close friends, who have known each other for long time  (Yang 1994). The 
Chinese are strongly inclined to categorize people as belonging to in and out groups, and 
members of in-groups are expected to fulfill their role obligations and demonstrate group 
solidarity (Farh et al, 1998). Social relationships are intensely personalized in China, and in this 
way, the guanxi ties are more multiplex. For example, boundaries between the personal and 
professional networks in China are blurred. Members of particular guanxi clusters are more 
homogeneous in terms of knowledge, worldview, and values, because many network members 
are classmates, who studied the same subjects, and colleagues, who worked together for many 
years (Farh et al, 1998). Homophily as a selection mechanism favors those who are similar in 
their worldviews since the social and geographic distances restrict contact search and tie 
formation (McPherson et al, 2001). The strong in-group pressure and intense guanxi 
communication homogenizes mindsets of members of a particular guanxi clique over time (Lin 
2001). Skillful consensus-making and willingness to accommodate each other’s opinions 
promotes greater perceived intellectual similarity in the Chinese guanxi. Interpersonal trust is 
higher in China than in Russia, because the institutional stability prevalent in China provides 
favorable conditions for relatively trustworthy behavior of actors (Raiser et al, 2001). These 
factors make the Chinese triads more transitive. 
In sharp contrast to China, the Russian networks contain greater numbers of structural holes, 
and are composed of heterogeneous members with regard to their knowledge, worldviews, and 
values (Sedaitis 1998). The internal hierarchy in the Russian networks is based on power and 
status, and this generates greater relational distance among network members (Kharkhordin & 
Gerber 1994). The Russian triads are less transitive, because there is less trust embedded in triads 
(Petrovskii 1991). Network brokerage is more accepted, and therefore, the Russian brokers are 
likely to draw greater values from their intermediate positions (Burt 1992). The Russians have 
greater opportunities for networking with people of diverse experience and education, because 
the education system and labor market are more liberalized. There is no dominant networking   12
principle, e.g., guanxi base in China, that structures personal networks, and therefore, the 
Russian  networks are composed of alters who differ in their ascribed and achieved attributes 
(Ledeneva 1994). Because of the less in-group cognitive pressure to internalize and accept views 
of other alters, the mindsets of Russian members are less homogenized over time. In the contrast 
to the harmony-loving Chinese, the Russians are more expressive in relationships and do not 
mind conflicts, and therefore, there is a greater perception of opinion diversity in the Russian 
networks. These features make the Russian triads less transitive. 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of referee-venture capitalist tie on referral will be greater in China 
than in Russia. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The impact of referee-entrepreneur tie on referral will be greater in China than in 
Russia. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The impact of trust of referee on investment decision will be greater in China than 
in Russia. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
Using several data sources, my research assistants and I created a list of 23 domestic 
private equity firms based in Moscow. I conducted structured telephone interviews with CEOs 
and lead fund managers of 15 VC firms in July-August 2004. Six CEOs have declined our 
request, and two were not reachable. In Beijing, we created a list of 117 domestic VC firms. My 
assistants and I interviewed 22 CEOs and lead fund managers of VC firms in September-October 
2004. Thirty-six CEOs refused to cooperate, and 58 were unreachable. In all, we interviewed 37 
CEOs and lead fund managers in two cities. 
  We asked each fund manager to select the last two positive investment decisions (firm 
decided to invest) based upon recommendation of third-parties (referees), and the last two 
negative investment decisions (firm decided not to investment) despite recommendations of 
third-parties. Thus, we collected information on a maximum of four investment decisions from 
each respondent. In this way, investments were selected randomly within two groups. In total, we 
collected information on 122 investment decisions: 61 positive and 61 negative.   13
Our sampling of investment decisions is retrospective matched sampling, because 
positive venture capital decisions are rare events (King and Zeng 2001). This method has been 
used fruitfully in venture capital research (Sorensen and Stuart 2001) and product innovation 
research (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). The use of a matched sample creates two problems. 
First, it does not accurately account for nonindependence across cases because each firm enters 
the analysis several times. One way to deal with this problem is to create firm dummies. In this 
study, however, we are required to create 37 venture capital firm dummies. We did not pursue 
this procedure for practical reasons. In addition, our sample of venture capital firms is random, 
and it indirectly mitigates biases of nonindepedence. Second, logistic and linear regression in 
matched data tends to produce underestimates of the factors that predict a positive outcome 
(King and Zeng 2001) and biased intercept terms (McCullagh and Nelder 1999). This implies 
that our findings on regression coefficients are on the conservative side, although we should take 
biased intercepts into account when we interpret our findings. 
The interview questionnaire was designed in English. The English version was translated 
into Chinese and Russian by teams of two scholars, and the Chinese and the Russian versions 
were back-translated by two professors of management in each country.  In addition, we pre-
tested our questionnaire with two fund managers in Beijing and Moscow. Each interview lasted 
in 30 minutes. 
Measures 
Independents. Referee-venture capitalist tie was measured by two items: “How close are you 
with the third-party”; “On average, how often do you talk to each third-party” (Cronbach’s alpha 
is 0.81) (Marsden 1990). These items were 4-point Likert scale items. First item was measured as 
especially close (4), close (3), less than close (2), and distant (1). Second item was measured as 
daily (4), weekly (3), monthly (2), and less often (1). The mean of two items was used as scale 
score. Referee-entrepreneur tie was measured as the mean of the following three questions: “I 
know that the third-party had a professional relationship with the entrepreneur prior the 
recommendation”; “I know that the third-party was engaged in informal social activities, e.g., 
dinners and other social activities, with the entrepreneur prior the recommendation”; “I know 
that the third-party and entrepreneur were personal friends prior the recommendation” 
(Cronbach’s alpha is 0.73). This variable and other independent variables were measured by 5-
point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). I adapted these items   14
from Shane & Cable (2002), although I had to reformulate them for investors rather than 
entrepreneurs themselves. Trust of referee was measured by the following item: “What extent do 
you trust the third-party?”. The distribution value was a 5-point Likert scale from do not trust (1) 
to trust very much (5). 
Dependents.  Investment selection is a binary variable of one if the venture received an 
investment, and zero otherwise. Referral was measured by the following question: “How strong 
was the recommendation of the third-party?”. The distribution value was 5-point Likert-scale 
from very weak (1) to very strong (5).  
Controls:  VC firm age is measured in years. VC firm size is the number of employees. IT 
industry is a binary variable of one if the firm is in the IT industry and zero otherwise. State 
ownership is a binary variable of one if the state is a shareholder and zero otherwise. Venture 
capitalist experience is measured in years. Initial investment sought is measured in $. Pre-
revenue is a binary variable of one if the firm had no revenues and zero otherwise. 
Entrepreneurial team scale was comprised of two questions: “At least one member of the 
venture team had previous startup experience”; “At least one member of the venture team had 
experience in the relevant industry” (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.76). Technology/product scale was 
measured by two items: “The technology employed or products offered by the venture would 
provide a significant competitive advantage”; “The venture's technology had a strong proprietary 
position” (Cronbach’s alpha is 0. 79). Growth potential scale was composed of two items: “The 
venture is a potentially high-growth firm”; “The venture's competitive strategy is superior than 
its competitors” (Cronbach alpha’s is 0.81). These items were adapted from Shane & Cable 
(2002).  
 Construct Validity. Measurements for referee-venture capitalist tie are externally valid, because 
these items have been proved as valid and reliable in previous research (Burt 2000; Marsden 
1990).  Measurements for referee-entrepreneur tie, entrepreneurial team, technology/product, and 
growth potential are externally valid, because previous research has shown that these items are 
valid and reliable (Shane & Cable 2002). 
Reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) for these measurements were above 0.73. I 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the measurement model associated with Likert-scale 
items to assess how well our interview questions load onto the constructs. I found that the 
comparative fit index is 0.81, the incremental fit index is 0.89, and the root mean-squared error   15
of approximation is 0.079. In addition, I carried out a factor analysis that focused only on 
independent variables: Fit indexes were above 0.81 and the factor loading was acceptable (the 
average on-factor loading was 0.61). The findings suggest that our data are valid internally. 
Shane & Cable (2002) did the same analysis for same-question items and found even better 
results. 
In order to check for the common-methods variance bias and the social desirability bias, 
we conducted data cross-validation phone calls. During the interviews, we asked for phone 
numbers of one referee and one entrepreneur. In all, we obtained phone numbers of twelve 
Chinese referees, eight Russian referees, nine Chinese entrepreneurs, and five Russian 
entrepreneurs. We made phone calls to both referees and entrepreneurs. 
In the case of referees, we asked several questions to verify perceptions of the venture 
capitalist. We asked the question: “How close are you with the venture capitalist?”. The answers 
of twelve Chinese referees and six Russian referees were consistent with our findings. We 
proposed the statement “I was engaged in informal social activities, e.g., dinners and other social 
activities, with the entrepreneur prior the recommendation”. The answers of nine Chinese 
referees and eight Russian referees matched our data. We asked the question: “What extent do 
you trust venture capitalists?”. We found that scales of eleven Chinese referees and seven 
Russian referees were congruent with the data that we collected from venture capitalists. Finally, 
we asked the question: “How strong was your recommendation?”. The answers of ten Chinese 
third-parties, and five Russian third-parties were consistent with our data. 
In the case of entrepreneurs, we validated several measurements. We asked the question: 
“I was engaged in informal social activities, e.g., dinners and other social activities, with the 
third-party prior the recommendation”. The answers of eight Chinese entrepreneurs, and four 
Russian entrepreneurs matched up our findings. We proposed the following statement: “At least 
one member of the venture team had previous startup experience”. The answers of all Chinese 
and Russian entrepreneurs were consistent with our data. We come up with the following 
statement: “The technology employed or products offered by the venture would provide a 
significant competitive advantage”. Six Chinese entrepreneurs, and three Russian entrepreneurs 
confirmed our findings. We also verified the answers to the following item: “The venture is a 
potentially high-growth firm”. Only four Chinese and three Russian entrepreneurs’ answers were 
consistent with venture capitalists’ assessment of their ventures. As a whole, these findings   16
suggest that our data on venture capitalists’ perceptions are valid, reliable, and less biased. To 
my knowledge, this study is the only study that cross-validated perceptions of triad members, 
i.e., venture capitalist, referee, and entrepreneur. Two trained research assistants, who were not 
members of the interview teams, conducted validation interviews in Beijing and Moscow. This 
study is a cross-level study in terms of unit of analysis. Predictor variables are measured at 
individual level but investment decision is measured at organizational level. Such research 
strategies are acceptable as long as measurements and constructs are valid internally and 
externally (Rousseau 1985).  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s correlations for all variables. 
Table 1 reveals that the mean VC firm age is 4 years (S.D.=2.47), and the mean number of 
employees (firm size) is 20 (S.D.=13.5). Fourteen percent of private equity firms were fully or 
partially state-owned. About a half of investee firms were IT firms. The Chinese and Russian 
venture capitalists appeared to be experienced – the mean year was 5.12 years (S.D.=2.57). The 
initial investment sought is high by developing country standards (the mean is $1.199 thousand), 
although standard deviation is greater than the mean (S.D.=$2.112). As was expected, one-third 
of firms were in pre-revenue stage (S.D=.47). 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and the ANOVA results of the Chinese and 
the Russian samples. It shows that two samples significantly differ from each other in several 
variables. Third-party referrals are stronger in Russia. However, referee-venture capitalist tie is 
stronger in China. The Chinese fund managers have greater trust in referees than the Russians. 
The Chinese venture capitalists assess entrepreneurial team and technology/product higher than 
the Russians. Private equity firms based in Moscow are older than firms based in Beijing. Most 
Chinese entrepreneurial firms were in the IT industry. The initial investment sought by the 
Russian startups are much smaller than the Chinese ventures. 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
Referral and Investment Decision 
In Table 3, I present the results of the linear regression analysis predicting referral. Model 
1 is the base model that examines the main effects of all control variables on referral. The model 
reveals that entrepreneurial team has significant positive effects on referral, and China dummy   17
has significant negative effects on referral. The model is significant (F=4.63). Model 2 indicates 
that referee-venture capitalist tie has significant positive effects on referral. The model is 
significant (F=6.49). Hypothesis 1 on referee-venture capitalist tie is supported. Model 3 reveals 
that referee-entrepreneur tie has significant positive effects on referral. The model is significant 
(F=5.46). Hypothesis 2 on referee-entrepreneur tie is confirmed. Model 4 is the full model. The 
model reveals that effects of dyadic ties on referral are significant and stable. The model is 
significant (F=6.7). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
  In Table 4, I present the results of logistical regression analysis predicting investment 
decision. Model 1 is the base model. It shows that VC firm size, IT industry, state ownership, 
entrepreneurial team, and growth potential has significant and positive effects on investment 
decisions. The impact of firm age, and China dummy is significant and negative. Model 2 reveals 
that trust of referee has significant positive effects on investment decisions of venture capitalists. 
Hypothesis 3 on trust of referee is supported. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
China versus Russia 
Table 5 illustrates the results of linear regression analysis predicting referral in China and 
Russia. Model 1 and Model 4 are the base models that examine effects of controls on the 
outcome variable in two countries, and they are significant (F=3.47; F=4.98). Model 2 and 
Model 5 show the effects of referee-venture capitalist tie on referral in China and Russia. The 
models reveal that effects of the predictor variable on the outcome variables are significant and 
positive, and regression coefficients are the same in two countries. Both models are significant 
(F=3.84; F=5.18). Hypothesis 4 that predicted greater effects of referee-venture capitalist tie on 
referral in China has not been confirmed. Models 3 and 6 demonstrate the impact of referee-
entrepreneur tie on referral in two cities. They reveal that effects of referee-entrepreneur tie are 
statistically not significant both in Beijing and Moscow. The models are significant (F=3.11; 
F=4.64).  Hypothesis 5 that suggested greater effects of Chinese referee-entrepreneur ties on 
referral is rejected.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
  In Table 6, I present the results of the logistic regression analysis predicting investment 
decision in two countries. Model 1 reveals that trust of referee has no impact on investment   18
decisions in China. In contrast, model 2 shows that trust of referee has significant positive effects 
on investment decisions of the Russian venture capitalists. Hypothesis 6 that expected a greater 
impact of trust on investment decision in the Chinese context is not supported. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
DISCUSSION 
The findings indicate that entrepreneur-referee-venture capitalist (E-R-VC) triad is 
transitive for the whole sample. Close dyadic ties and interpersonal trust within the triad make 
the Chinese and Russian triads complete and consistent. This finding is supportive of 
Granovetter’s (1973) theorizing that transitivity of triads is contingent upon tie strength and trust 
among triple actors. To my knowledge, this is first empirical finding that verifies the role of 
strong dyadic ties in triad integration and cohesiveness. 
Friendly relationships between triad members positively influence referral and 
investment decision as indicators of transitivity. Strong referee-venture capitalist ties lead to 
serious referral, because third-parties search for and recommend high quality projects, match 
investors’ policy, involvement, and personality. Matching as a referral mechanism is effective in 
the venture finance context (Fernandez et al, 2000). Since referees reduce search and 
identification costs of fund managers, they are inclined to produce enthusiastic 
recommendations. This makes E-R-VC triads transitive. Because investors are their friends, 
third-parties seem to encounter fewer social constraints to reach out and convince venture 
capitalists. A social calculation may also be at work: Strong referrals increase perceived 
indebtedness of venture capitalists to third-parties, and therefore, referees are motivated to issue 
good recommendations. Friends are likely to overestimate each other’s capabilities and 
resources, and this overestimation is conducive to solid referrals. Lastly, emotional 
idiosyncrasies between friends play positive role in producing serious references. 
The mechanisms through which referee-entrepreneur relationship influences referral 
practices are effective. Actors attempt to balance relationships, and reduce social uncertainties. 
Referral is a chance to establish a balance in their immediate social circles. Information 
exchange between third-parties and entrepreneurs facilitates effective communication and 
understanding, and this leads to convincing referrals. Social expectations and informal control 
devices positively affect referee’s assessment of teams’ abilities and venture potential. Skillful   19
manufacturing of social “receivables” is conducive to triad closure. The matching mechanism is 
likely to lead to credible references. These factors generate more cohesive triads. 
Interpersonal trust between third-parties and investors have positive impacts on 
investment decision. Trust makes a difference because venture capitalists value opinions of 
referees on entrepreneurial team ability, technology, and growth potential of the venture. 
Therefore, the Chinese and Russian fund managers invest in those ventures that have references 
from trustworthy actors. The entrepreneurs who were recommended by trusted referees are 
perceived to be less opportunistic, and that they do not engage in dubious activities such as 
machinations in investment flows, revenues, and cash flows. This makes their ventures worthy to 
invest, and increases expected returns upon investment. High-trust relationships may bias 
exchange partners in each other’s capabilities and resources, and these biases positively 
influence investment decisions. Lastly, an outcome of trusted relationships is overconfidence of 
exchange partners in each other’s behavioral predictability, and honesty. In the Chinese and 
Russian contexts, interpersonal trust between investor and third-party is conducive to positively 
investment decisions that make small groups such as triple of actors more integrated and 
cohesive. 
Comparative hypotheses on China versus Russia were not confirmed. It appears that 
referee-venture capitalist tie affects referrals to the same extent in the two countries. The 
mechanisms through which third-party-investor relationship influences references are effective 
in the two cities. Thus, transitivity of triads in China and Russia is contingent upon dyadic tie 
strength. The finding suggests that the industry context (private equity industry) may influence 
effects of dyadic ties on references to a greater degree. In contrast, the institutional, social, and 
cultural differences between the two nations have minimal impacts on effects of tie strength on 
the outcome variable. 
While trust of referee has no effects on investors’ decisions in China, trust between third-
party and venture capitalist is conducive to positive decisions in Russia. This finding is the 
opposite of my prediction. Several explanations are suggested. First, in the society where 
generalized trust is very low, interpersonal trust plays a greater role, because actors attempt to 
reduce their risks and uncertainties by trusting concrete individuals rather than relying on 
abstract rules, norms and values. Second, when public institutions are dysfunctional or non-
existent, particularistic ties are often the only channel of getting things done (Xin and Pearce   20
1996). In this way, players are “forced” to rely on personal relationships, and trust individuals to 
survive. Finally, the Russian cultural heritage, and the Soviet legacy of trusting of individuals 
and rulers, and distrusting of institutions and rules, may explain why interpersonal trust is 
important in Russia. However, these explanations are only suggestions, because I do not test 
directly effects of these factors on interpersonal trust and investment decisions. Thus, in the 
context of extreme institutional chaos and generalized low trust, trust between two actors in 
triads makes those triads more transitive. In other words, the way in which interpersonal trust 
facilitates transitivity is dependent upon the institutional context and generalized trust in that 
society. The lower the generalized trust, the greater the reliance on individuals rather than on 
institutions, rules, and norms. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examined effects of dyadic ties and interpersonal trust on referrals and 
investment decisions of venture capitalists as indicators of transitivity of triads. The study found 
an empirical proof of the hitherto untested postulate of social network theory that transitivity is a 
function of tie strength and interpersonal trust (Granovetter 1973). Whether triads are transitive 
depends on referee-investor relationship, referee-entrepreneur tie, and trust of third-party. 
Effects of dyadic ties and interpersonal trust on referral and investment decision seems to 
be universal rather than country or context specific, because industry factors have dominant 
effects on these outcome variables. Contrary to my expectations, interpersonal trust have greater 
effects in Russia. 
I see a number of contributions of this article to the management research literature. First, 
this article provides the empirical evidence that network transitivity is contingent upon tie 
strength and trust. This is an empirical contribution to the research literature on networks. 
Second, to my knowledge, this is first study of venture capital practices by employing the 
concept of transitivity, and therefore, I claim a contribution to the entrepreneurship literature. 
Third, to my knowledge, this is study is first and only comparative study of the Chinese and 
Russian private equity industries. Therefore, this article makes a contribution to the growing 
management literature on transition economies. 
Several limitations should be discussed. This is a retrospective study about past 
investment decisions, and therefore, the extent to which respondents recall information 
accurately might be an issue. The sample size is small, and sampling is neither complete nor   21
random. There is also an issue of the potential nonindependence of observations. I used social 
capital measurements that were developed in the Western context for measuring indigenous 
phenomena deeply rooted the Chinese and Russian cultures ⎯ guanxi and svyazi. In this way, I 
may have overlooked unique features of Chinese guanxi and Russian svyazi.  The private equity 
industries in China and Russia are young. This institutional condition may have affected our 
results, although I assume that all the respondents have been exposed to the same conditions to 
the same extent.  
An important research implication is that one should test the postulate of transitivity in 
other industry contexts and other country contexts. A practical implication is that entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists are suggested to nurture dyadic ties and trust in triads to increase benefits 
generated from networks.    22
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Figure 1: Triad of Entrepreneur, Referee (Third Party), and Venture Capitalist 
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                 Entrepreneur (E)                                            Venture Capitalist (VC)   27
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations 
 
  Variables  N  M  SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1  Investment  decision  122  .50  .50        
2 Referral  120 3.49  1.1  .17           
3 Referee-venture 
capitalist tie 
121  2.42  .66  .28** .14      
4 Referee-entrepreneur 
tie 
121 2.89  .73  .2* .34** .29**      
5 Trust  of  referee  121 2.99  .95 .28** .12 .38** .1     
6 Entrepreneurial  team 121 3.90  .89 .32** .01 .24** .11  .4**   
7  Technology/product  121  3.6  .91  .54** .22*  .22* .32** .22* .43**
8 Growth  potential  121 3.77  .99 .64** .24** .24** .39** .09 .28**
9 Firm  age  124  4  2.47  .06 .26** .26** .15  -.09 -.28* 
10  Firm  size  124 20 13.5  -.01 .05 .05 .02 .13 -.05 
11  IT  industry  124 .48  .5  .16 -.07 .21* .03 .21* .2* 
12 State  ownership  124  .14  .35  .07  -.00  -.04  .03  .2*  .2* 
13 Venture  capitalist 
experience 
124  5.12  2.57  .06 .13 .08 .12 -.01  -.01 
14 Initial  investment 
(Thousand $) 
111  1199  2112  -.08 -.11 -.03 -.12 .15  .15 
15 Pre-revenue  121  .33  .47  -
.25**
-.02 -
.24**
-.18* -.21* -.21* 
16 China 
 
124 .51  50  0  -
.43**
.33** -.07 .28**  .28**
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations (Con’t) 
  
  Variables  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 
8  Growth  potential  .7**          
9  Firm  age  -.14  .01         
10 Firm  size  -
.25** 
.01  .52**       
11  IT  Industry  .02  .08  -.16  -.08       
12  State  ownership  .05  .05  .36** -.09  .05      
13 Venture  capitalist 
experience 
.01 .21*  .54** .44** -.08  .36**      
14 Initial  investment 
(Thousand $) 
.23* -
.25**
.08 -.02 -.09 -.03  -.13     
15 Pre-revenue  -
.28** 
-.18*  .08 -.09  -.17 .02 .14 .11   
16 China 
 
.28** .02  -
.38**
-.07 .25** .03  -.1  .29** -.14 
 
 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01   28
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA of the Chinese and Russian Samples 
 
   China 
 
Russia ANOVA 
model 
  
 
N Means  S.D. N Means S.D.  F 
1 Referral 
  60 3  1.18  60  3.96  .75  27.32*** 
2 Referee-venture  capitalist 
tie  61 2.63  .63 60  2.2  .62  14.57*** 
3 Referee-entrepreneur  tie 
  61 2.84  .94 60 2.95  .44  .59 
4  Trust of referee 
  61 3.26  1.11  60 2.71  .66  10.71*** 
5 Entrepreneurial  team 
  61 4.41  .85 60 3.39  .6 57.14*** 
6 Technology/product 
  61 3.77  1.05  60 3.43  .69  4.51* 
7 Growth  potential 
  61 3.79  1.18  60 3.75  .75  .06 
8 Firm  age 
  64 3.12  1.06  60  5  3.12  20.52*** 
9 Firm  size 
  64 19 9 60 20  16  .6 
10 IT  industry 
  64 .6  .49  60  .35 .48 8.8** 
11 State  ownership 
  64 .15  .36  60 .13  .34  .12 
12 Venture  capitalist 
experience  64 4.86  2.61  60  5.4  2.51  1.33 
13 Initial  investment 
(Thousand $)  55 1835  2830  56  575  513 10.7*** 
14 Pre-revenue 
  61 .26  .44  60  .4  .49  2.6 
 
 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001 
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Table 3. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Referral (N=124) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Controls      
      
Firm age 
 
.2 .27¶  .09 .18 
Firm size 
 
-.05 -.31* -.01  -.23 
IT industry 
 
.05 -.01 .04 -.01 
State ownership 
 
-.11 -.16 -.08 -.13 
Venture capitalist experience 
 
.05 .12 .05 .11 
Initial investment (Thousand $) 
 
.01 .01 .03 .03 
Pre-revenue 
 
-.06 -.04 -.03 -.03 
Entrepreneurial team 
 
.22¶ .27* .21¶ .25* 
Technology/product 
 
.2  .04 .14 .03 
Growth potential 
 
.1  .07 .05 .04 
China 
 
-.51*** -.59*** -.51*** -.58*** 
      
Predictors      
      
Referee-venture capitalist tie 
 
 .41***  .33*** 
Referee-entrepreneur tie 
 
   .29***  .2* 
      
Model F 
 
4.63*** 6.49*** 5.64***  6.7*** 
Adjusted R square 
 
.26 .37 .33  .4 
 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Investment Decision (N=124) 
 
 Model  1 
 
Model 2 
  B B 
Controls    
    
Firm age 
 
-.61* -.42¶ 
Firm size 
 
.06¶ .01 
IT industry 
 
1.12¶ .85 
State ownership 
 
4** 2.31 
Venture capitalist experience 
 
.04 .19 
Initial investment (Thousand $) 
 
.01 .01 
Pre-revenue 
 
-.58 -.92 
Entrepreneurial team 
 
1.39* 1.25* 
Technology/product 
 
.7 .41 
Growth potential  
 
2.17*** 2.44*** 
China 
 
-3.99** -3.93** 
    
Predictor    
    
Trust of referee 
 
 .95* 
    
-2LL 
 
77.16 73.36 
Chi-square 
 
76.63*** 80.43*** 
 
Values represent B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001 
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Table 5. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Referral in China and Russia 
 
 China  Russia 
  Model 1  Model 2 
 
Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Controls        
        
Firm age 
 
.71***  .66***  .65**  -.48 -.58 -.46 
Firm size 
 
.14 -.02 .13 -.06 -.19 -.08 
IT industry 
 
.05 .01 .05 .05 .04 .02 
State ownership 
 
-.06 -.1 -.06  -.09 .02 -.06 
Venture capitalist 
experience 
.31* .34* .29¶ .71¶ .77* .66¶ 
Initial investment 
(Thousand $) 
-.30¶ -.24  -.27  .08  -.01  .1 
Pre-revenue 
 
-.05 -.02 -.04 .11  .03  .14 
Entrepreneurial team 
 
.24¶ .31* .23¶ .38* .34* .48* 
Technology/product 
 
.09 -.05 .09 .21 .04 .18 
Growth potential 
 
.15 -.09 -.15  .33*  .24¶  .41* 
        
Predictors        
        
Referee-venture capitalist 
tie 
 .3*    .3*  
Referee-entrepreneur tie 
 
   .07     -.15 
        
Model F 
 
3.47** 3.84*** 3.11** 4.98***  5.18***  4.64*** 
Adjusted R square 
 
.31 .37  .3  .42 .45 .42 
 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001 
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Table 6. Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Investment Decision in China and Russia (N=124) 
 
 China  Russia 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    
Controls    
    
Firm age 
 
-.1 .36 
Firm size 
 
-.02 -.14 
IT industry 
 
.19 .37 
State ownership 
 
-.46 -5.06 
Venture capitalist experience 
 
.11 1.02¶ 
Initial investment (Thousand $) 
 
.00 -.01¶ 
Pre-revenue 
 
-.47 -1.77¶ 
    
Predictor    
    
Trust of referee 
 
.49 2.78** 
    
-2LL 
 
71.07 48.05 
Chi-square 
 
5 29.58*** 
 
Values represent B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001  
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